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Abstract: We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in
species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the
metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior
account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an
evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious
problems for the latter account.
Carruthers acknowledges that evidence for metacognition in
species lacking mindreading would provide dramatic evidence for
the metacognition-is-prior view and against the mindreading-is-
prior view, and he asserts that the existing evidence can be
explained using a first-order system of belief and desire strengths
(target article, sect. 5.2; see also Carruthers 2008b). We evaluated
similar response strategies using formal modeling (Smith et al.
2008) and found indeed that some animal metacognition findings
could be explained using first-order strategies. Yet Carruthers’
use here of the field’s earliest paradigms and oldest data to make
his argument is unfortunately selective. More recent paradigms
often do not support his first-order argument and description.
Smith et al. (2006) dissociated monkeys’ uncertainty responding
fromany reinforcement and stimulus cues that couldhaveorganized
Carruthers’ gradients of first-order beliefs and response tendencies.
It was clear in that study that monkeys’ uncertainty-response
strategies were adjudicated cognitively and decisionally, not using
first-order cues. They followed the animal’s subjective decisional
construal of the task. Couchman et al. (submitted) extended this
dissociation to situations of broader task transfer in which animals
had to establish functional regions of judged difficulty and uncer-
tainty even when forced to self-organize their task performance.
Recent cross-species research on uncertainty monitoring also
speaks against first-order interpretations of uncertainty-monitor-
ing performances. Beran et al. (in press) gave capuchin monkeys
a Sparse-Uncertainty-Dense task that was matched to a Sparse-
Middle-Dense task. Capuchins used the middle (first-order)
response easily and naturally. They almost never used the uncer-
tainty response, despite having the reinforcement history needed
to do so. Likewise, elegant research by Shettleworth and her
colleagues (Inman & Shettleworth 1999) has shown that
pigeons also do not express an uncertainty-responding capability,
even when there are strong first-order reasons for them to do so.
It is an important implication from these cross-species results
that the organizing psychology underlying uncertainty respond-
ing is not first-order, because adept first-order animals such as
capuchins and pigeons cannot find and use that psychology.
Inotherwritings,Carruthers (2008b) also acknowledges that first-
order beliefs and desires will not explain the wide-ranging empirical
findings of uncertainty monitoring and information seeking by
animals. He devises a secondary mental construct to explain why
an animal uses the uncertainty response in too-close-to-call situ-
ations. He suggests that some species have a gate-keeping “mechan-
ism . . . which when confronted with conflicting plans that are too
close to one another in strength will refrain from acting on the
one that happens to be strongest at that moment, and will initiate
alternative information-gathering behavior instead” (p. 66 ).
The gatekeeper mechanism operates on first-order cognition’s
outputs to assess their ability to produce a correct response. It
meets the definition of a second-order controlled cognitive
process. It produces a qualitative change in behavior and cogni-
tive strategy (information seeking, uncertainty responses, etc.).
It typifies the metacognitive utility that all theorists have
envisioned. Even in Carruthers’ own description of animals’ cog-
nitive self-regulation, it seems, metacognition is prior.
Another analytic problem in the target article concerns the
different standard of evidence that is applied to studies of animal
metacognition and studies of animal mindreading. It seems
highly unlikely, and it goes completely undefended in the target
article (sect. 5, para. 2) that all the metacognition paradigms fall
prey to behaviorist explanations, but that all the mindreading para-
digms are veridical. They clearly are not (Heyes 1998).
Carruthers makes a valid suggestion that, if metacognition is
prior, one should be able to explore the evolutionary pressures
that produced a free-standing metacognitive utility. Fortunately,
James (1890/1952), Dewey (1934/1980), Tolman (1938), and
many others have provided this evolutionary narrative (see also
Smith et al. 2003). Animals often encounter doubtful and uncer-
tain situations in which their habitual stimulus-response associ-
ations do not clearly indicate a safe and adaptive response.
They would benefit enormously in those situations from having
an online cognitive utility that will let them assemble the relevant
facts and recollections and choose an adaptive course of action.
Metacognition provides exactly this utility.
It is also a remarkable phylogenetic fact that there appear to be
no species that show mindreading ability but fail to show meta-
cognitive ability. This could be used to support more than one
of the possibilities discussed in the target article. However, it
clearly supports least of all the mindreading-is-prior account.
Finally, we believe that an evolutionary perspective on this issue
raises a serious problem for themindreading-is-prior account. The
author’s accountmay, in principle, explain thedevelopmentofmeta-
cognition ontogenetically, especially if one assumes a parent is con-
stantly informing you of the intentions of others. Your mother may
tell you, “Johnny wants a cookie” while you see Johnny reaching
for the cookie jar, and the next time you find yourself reaching for
the cookie jar, you may well apply “wants a cookie” to yourself.
This works only because humans communicate their knowledge of
concepts and intentions from one generation to the next.
The first mindreading animal would have no basis for which to
make an attribution of a mental state. How would it be possible or
beneficial to attribute “wants a cookie” to Johnny, if the attributer
has no known experience with “wanting,” no understanding of
“what it is like to want” and no idea that it has ever “wanted”?
The mindreading-is-prior account must explain how, from
nothing but observed physical behavior, and with no reason to
ever attribute anything but cause-and-effect mechanical pro-
cesses, animals came to attribute subjective belief and desire
states to others. This would be equivalent to knowing there is
something “that it is like” to be a bat (Nagel 1974) prior to
knowing that there is anything “that it is like” to be you!
Indeed, exactly the opposite seems to be true. We have great
access to and a rich understanding of our own mental states
and only a very limited understanding of the mental states of
others. We first knew what it was like to know, and then
assumed that others might be having an analogous experience.
This process of extending mental concepts outward is surely a
more plausible and tractable evolutionary narrative. Within that
narrative, metacognition is prior.
Introspection, confabulation, and
dual-process theory
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Abstract: This excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-
process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of
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